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Abstract: The development of cross-border e-commerce highlights the importance of service integration and information
sharing. This paper considers a cross-border B2B supply chain which consists of a local manufacturer and a foreign trade
service integrator. The service integrator holds the service cost structure as private information. The optimal decisions and
maximum expected profits of the manufacturer and service integrator are analyzed under two scenarios：no information
sharing versus information sharing. The paper finds that information sharing always benefit the manufacturer but not for the
service integrator. In the meanwhile, the value of information is increased with the manufacturer’s forecast uncertainty about
the service integrator’s service cost. The whole supply chain can get pareto improvement through the Nash bargaining
mechanism.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Cross-border e-commerce usually refers to transactions, payments and logistics in different countries

through e-commerce

[1]

. As a new type of e-commerce, cross-border e-commerce has been widely spread and

developed rapidly under the national strategy background of "One Belt and One Road (B&R)" in China

[2]

.

According to the data from China's cross-border e-commerce research center in May 2017, China's cross-border
e-commerce import and export reached 6.6 trillion yuan in 2016, Increased by 38.7% over the same period in
2015, and B2B accounted for 88.7% of total transactions in China's cross-border e-commerce.
China’s B2B cross-border e-commerce SME (small- and medium-sized enterprises) trade occurs mainly
through foreign trade service integrators

[3]

. These all-in-one integrators (e.g., Onetouch.alibaba.com,

Globalsources.com, DHgate.com) with integrated services for international logistics, cross-border payments,
internet financing, multilingual services, etc.

[4]

. These integrated services can not only enhance the platform

experience, but also bring new customers to the SME. For example, DHgate.com is rich in supporting services
to10 million enterprises and individual buyers from nearly 230 countries and regions provided by specialist
partners from logistics (UPS, DHL, FedEx, TNT, etc.), to payments (MasterCard, VISA, American Express,
etc.), to technology innovation, to internet financing (China Construction Bank, etc.).
Due to the dynamics of resources, customers and services, these service integrators often keep some private
information in order to seek more profits, which causes the information asymmetry problem[5]. The existence of
asymmetric information often leads to the loss of efficiency and brings difficulties to the coordination of the
supply chain system. How to collaborate with these service integrators under information asymmetry become a
key issue restricting the development of china’s cross-border e-commerce.
Cost information asymmetry is ubiquitous in distributed supply chain systems [6]. Kumar and Pugazhendhi[7]
indicated that information sharing is one of the important tools of coordination among firms in a supply chain,
*
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and allow enterprises to refine their strategies of supply chain to maximize their profits. Ketzenberg et al.[8]
reported that the value of information sharing can range from 0 to 30% proﬁt increase.
Information sharing has been extensively studied in previous literature. The early research focuses on the
incentives to share information with horizontal competition in oligopoly(Gal-Or[9]; Li[10]). Recent literature has
been studied different types of information (e.g., demand, cost, inventory) sharing under complex competition.
Some papers focused on demand information sharing. For example, Zhang

[11]

took the leakage effect into

account and suggested that the retailers will not share private demand information with the supplier in Cournot
duopoly. Li and Zhang
decisions. Ha et al.

[13]

[12]

examined how the level of confidentiality influences firms information sharing

focus on vertical information sharing under two competing supply chains consider

production diseconomies. Jiang and Hao

[14]

examined both vertical and horizontal information sharing under

different channel structures. Cost-information sharing has also been studied by several scholars. For example,
Yao et al.

[15]

explored cost information sharing in a supply chain by considering value-added costs as retailer’s

private information, they indicated that the retailers are not always better off with information sharing. Zhou and
Zhu

[16]

investigated the incentive for cost-information sharing under Cournot competition. Kostamis and

Duenyas

[17]

demonstrated the value of both cost and demand information sharing. Zhao et al.

supply chain with two service providers competing for one client. Setak et al.

[19]

[18]

considered a

demonstrated that the

manufacturer with cooperative advertising program can encourage the retailers to share their cost information.
In this paper, we study information asymmetry in a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local
manufacturer and a synthesized service integrator, the actual service cost is known only to services integrator
herself unless she shares it with the manufacturer. We aim to address the following problems:
a)

How do supply chain members decide under complete and uncomplete information scenario?

b) Can service cost information sharing improve supply chain profitability?
c)

Is it possible to induce service integrator to sharing information?

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem and the
assumptions of the model. In Section 3, we present the decision under no information sharing case. In Section 4,
we present the decision under complete information. In Section 5, we analyze the model and discuss a profit
distribution mechanism. In Section 6, we conclude the paper and give the future research directions.
2.

MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local manufacturer and a cross-border service

integrator (SI). The SI provide service package at price

to foreign buyers, the service package includes

pre-sales consulting, supplier selection, supplier qualification certification, logistics and route selection,
financing loans, export tax rebates, etc. The manufacturer produces a single product at a unit cost
his product to foreign buyers at a price
reflects

the

practice

of

and sells

through SI, and need to pay SI a membership fee K. The assumption

cross-border

service

platforms

(e.g.,

Globalsourse.com,

Alibaba.com,

Made-in-China.com,etc.) who use the membership mechanisms. We assume that the membership fee K is fixed
and exogenous to our model. We note that in this paper, the fixed membership fee K does not have any effect on
the results, then K is not included in our model analysis and discussion.
Let

denote the consumer demand from the manufacturer and SI, respectively. We utilize a linear

demand function which is widely used in supply chain literature (Tsay and Agrawal[19] ; Dan et al.[5]). The
corresponding demand functions to the manufacturer and the SI are described as follows:
(1)
(2)
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Where
of

;

is the coefﬁcient of service price elasticity

corresponds to market potential;
is the coefﬁcient of price elasticity of

the service demand and

. The parameters

is the SI’s services sensitivities of

are the free-ride services sensitivities to the manufacturer (

. is the

service package level determined by SI. We use the service package to represent the all forms of SI’s services
together which is widely used in previous literature (Li et al. [20]; Dan et al. [21]). The conditions

≥ 0,

≥

0 are specified to ensure that both demand non-negative.
The SI’s service cost function is generally assumed to be convex with a commonly adopted form

[5], [15]

as

below:
（3）
Where η is an efficiency parameter for the SI 's cost,

. this cost parameter is assumed to

be the private information, known only to the SI. Many streams of research find that firms may protect their
advantage by hiding their cost information, and they are reluctant to reveal their private information for the risk
of information leakage [11], [12]. From the manufacturer's point of view, this parameter is a random variable with a
known probability distribution f (η).
With the above notation, the SI’s and the manufacturer’s profit function are given by
（4）
（5）
There is no leader in this supply chain.The manufacturer and SI make price decisions independently of
each other. Thus, the SI determines its price
manufacturer determines its price

and service level

to maximize its proﬁt

to maximize its proﬁt

. Uninformed

.

For ease of reference, we add super script ND, SD on the equilibrium outcomes, where ND indicates that
SI neither share signals nor cooperate in decision making, SD indicates that SI share signals and independently
make decisions. We will contrast the optimal policies of both channel partners in the two cases: incomplete
information when the manufacturer didn’t get the exact cost information (Section 3), and information sharing
when the manufacturer knows η exactly (Section 4).
3.

THE CASE OF NO INFORMATION SHARING (ND)
In this section, we solve the game-theoretic problem for the case of no information sharing. The actual

service cost is known only to SI herself unless she shares it with the manufacturer. The manufacturer does not
know the exact value of
uniformly distributed, i.e.,

, but knows its distribution. According to Yao et al.
and

[15]

, we assume that

are the average and deviation of the service cost

efficiency, respectively.
The manufacturer and the SI make their decisions to maximize their own profit respectively. The model in
no information sharing case is presented as follows:

is
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Proposition1: Under the no information sharing case, the manufacturer’s optimal prices, SI’s optimal service
price and optimal service level can be given as:

(7)

(8)
(9)
Where
Proof：
Suppose the condition

satisfy, since

,which indicates that

.
The hessian matrix
so

is negative definite when the conditions

is jointly concave with

satisfy,

.

The optimal decisions for SI are obtained by solving the first-order conditions:
(10)

Further substituting

and

into the manufacturers’ profit functions in Eqs. (6), we get

by solving the first-order conditions, we can obtain the manufacturers’ optimal prices

<0,

.

Corollary 1. The optimal profits of the manufacturer and SI are:
(11)
(12)
Where

4.

THE CASE OF INFORMATION SHARING (SD)
In this section, we solve the game-theoretic problem for the case where the manufacturer has complete

information about the SI's service cost parameter η. The model in information sharing case is presented as
follows:

(13)
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Proposition2: Under the information sharing case, the manufacturer’s optimal prices, the SI’s optimal service
price and optimal service level can be given as:
(14)
(15)
(16)
Proof:
Following the same procedure as what is done in the proof of Proposition1, we have the result.
Corollary 2. The optimal profits of the manufacturer and SI are:
(17)
(18)
Above, we have obtained closed form solutions for all decision variables and the respective profits of both
parties in terms of the market parameters. The difference in profits in these two cases will give us the value of
the information to the manufacturer. We will discuss these models in more detail in the next section.
5.

DISCUSSION

5.1 The value of information sharing
In this subsection, we study the interesting question of how the profit of each channel partner changes from
the incomplete information case to the complete information case.
Proposition 3. (i)The manufacturer’s profit will always increase when the information about the SI's service
cost structure is shared with him. The amount of increase

is given by:
(19)

(ii) The SI does not benefit from the information sharing, her profit is the same as SD and ND scenario,
.
(iii) Service cost information sharing can improve the whole supply chain profitability,

>0.

Proof:
By the equilibrium results given in Corollary1 and Corollary 2, we have
, It is easy to verify that
Obviously,

>0.

,then the amount of total supply chain profit increase is

. Hence the claim.
To examine the effects of service uncertainty
first-order partial derivatives of

on the supply members optimal decisions, we take the

with respect to , and obtain the following proposition.

Proposition 4. The amount of manufacturer’s profit increase

is increased with the manufacturer’s
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estimate uncertainty
Proof:
We rewrite the equation (19) as follows:

.

let

,we can obtain

by solve .

.
When
When

,

=0
,

,
，

It can be shown that
Therefore

,thus

.

.

Proposition 4 shows that the more uncertain the manufacturer’s estimate about the SI’s service cost
structure, the higher the value of information. It would be profitable for the manufacturer if he can encourage
the SI to share her service cost information,

would be the maximum amount the manufacturer would be

willing to spend for the information. Notice that the SI's profit is the same as SD and ND scenario because her
optimal service price and service level only depend on her own cost structure, so the SI has no incentives to
share her service cost information to the manufacturer. The willingness of SI to share her cost information can
be achieved by a profit allocation mechanism. Next section we will use a Nash bargaining model to solve this
problem.
5.2 Nash bargaining solution
In this subsection, we want to figure out how to align benefits between members and create motivation to
induce service integrator to sharing information.
Let

respresent the portion of the extra-profit the manufacturer and the SI received at the

information sharing scenario, respectively. In order to ensure the success of the information sharing, an optimal
profit scheme is acceptable to both the manufacturer and the SI only if
According to Nash

[23]

.

,We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer have the following utility

functions:
(20)
(21)
.
Where

are the bargaining power for manufacturer and SI, respectively.

Bargaining power is determined by negotiation skills, risk tolerance and bargaining tactics, etc.
The optimal bargaining profit scheme is obtained by maximizing the system utility function:
（22）

The optimal solution of this problem is

,

.
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Where

. Thus, both the manufacturer and the SI can gain from

information sharing, which leads to a win-win solution for the whole cross-border B2B supply chain.
6.

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local manufacturer and a service

integrator who face a demand sensitive to product price, service price, and service level. We assume only
services integrator has private information about her service cost to reflect the information asymmetry between
supply members. The manufacturer is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader, and two scenarios are analyzed: no
information sharing case and the complete information case. Our results indicate that information sharing
always has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s performance but not for the service integrator. The service
integrator would be motivated to share its private information with the manufacturer under some profits
allocation mechanisms．
Our research can be extended in many two directions. First, we can figure out what kind of contracts can
coordinate the supply chain. Second, we can consider the competition among several manufacturers and service
integrators.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported by the MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Project of Humanities and
Social Sciences under Grant15YJA630087.
REFERENCES
[1] Yue Hongfei, Wu Jiani, Yao Lin (2017). Analysis on the development and bottlenecks of China’s cross-border
e-commerce. Studies in Asian Social Science, 4(2): 26-35.(in chinease)
[2] Xue, Wanxin; Li, Dandan; and Pei, Yilei (2016). The development and current of cross-border e-commerce. WHICEB
2016 Proceedings, 53.
[3] Tao Tao, Li Guangqian (2014). Platform evolution, pattern discrimination and development orientation of cross-border
e-commerce, Reform, China and Globalization, (9): 63-73. (in Chinese)
[4] Research group (2017).Analysis on the pathway and risk avoidance of cross border B2B E-commerce platform. China
Business and Market,31(11):54-60 (in chinease)
[5]

Dan bin, Lou Yun, Han Xiaopeng, Zhang xumei. (2017). Pricing and coordination strategy in
product-service supply chain with service demand affected by sales. Journal of Systems &
Management,26(2):381-389. (in chinease)

[6] Agrell P J, Lindroth R, Norman A(2004). Risk, information and incentives in telecom supply chains. International
Journal of Production Econmics,90(1):1-16.
[7] Kumar R S, Pugazhendhi S (2012) .Information sharing in supply chains: an overview. Process Engineer
38:2147–2154.
[8] Ketzenberg M E, Geismar N , Metters R ,Vander Laan E (2013). The value of information for managing retail inventory
remotely. Production and Operations Management, 22(4):811–825.
[9] Gal-Or, E. (1985). Information sharing in oligopoly. Econometrica, 53(2)：329–343.
[10] Li, L. (1985). Cournot oligopoly with information sharing. RAND Journal of Economic,16(4)：521–536.
[11] Zhang H (2002).Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duopoly. Production and Operations
Management,11(4):531–546.
[12] Li L, Zhang H (2008). Conﬁdentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination. Management

The Seventeenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－Cross-border e-Commerce Initiatives under China’s Belt and Road Initiative

55

science,54(8):1467–1481.
[13] Ha A Y, Tong S, Zhang H (2011). Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production
diseconomies. Management Science, 57(3):566–581.
[14] Jiang L, Hao Z Y(2016). Incentive-driven information dissemination in two-tier supply shains[J]. Manufacturing &
service operations management, 18(3): 393-413
[15] Yao D-Q, Yue X, Liu J (2008) Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers. Omega
36:838–851
[16] Zhou Z Z , Zhu, K X(2010). The effects of information transparency on suppliers, manufacturers, and consumers in
online
markets. Marketing Science, 29 (6): 1125–1137.
[17] Kostamis D, Duenyas I(2011). Purchasing under asymmetric demand and cost information: when is more private
information better? Operations Research59(4): 914–928.
[18] Zhao X, Xue L, Zhang F. (2014). Outsourcing competition and information sharing with asymmetrically informed
suppliers. Production and Operations Management, 23(10): 1706–1718.
[19] Setak M, Kafshian Ahar H, Alaei S (2017) Coordination of information sharing and cooperative advertising in a
decentralized supply chain with competing retailers considering free riding behavior. Journal of Industrial and Systems
Engineering, 10:151–168.
[20] Tsay AA, Agrawal N (2004). Channel conﬂict and coordination in the e-commerce age. Production and Operations
Management ,13(1):93-110
[21] Li X, Li Y, Cai X, Shan J(2015). Service channel choice for supply chain: who is better off by undertaking the service?
Production and Operations Management, 25 (3): 513–534.
[22] Dan B, Zhang S G, Zhou M S (2017). Strategies for warranty service in a dual-channel supply chain with value-added
service competition. International Journal of Production Research, DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2017.1377355.
[23] Nash J F(1950).The bargaining problem.Econometrica,18:155–62.

